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Electronic document; secure electronic
signature (digital signature); criminal
procedure; Ustawa z dnia 18 wrzes´nia 2001 r. o
podpisie elektronicznym (Law of 2001.09.18 on
electronic signature); legal effect
Case reference number I KZP 39/08
COURT RULING
Date: March 26, 2009
The Supreme Court consisting of:
Presiding judge: Judge of the Supreme Court Wieslaw
Kozielewicz
Judge of the Supreme Court Dariusz S´więcicki (reporting
judge)
Judge of the Court of Appeals assigned to the Supreme
Court Eugeniusz Wildowicz
Court reporter: Łukasz Majewski
with the participation of the Public Prosecutor of the
State Prosecutor’s Office Wincenty Grzeszczyk
in the case of Piotr B.
having examined in the Penal Chamber at a hearing,
of the case reference number IV.1.Waz 502/08,
forwarded for consideration by the Regional Court in K.,
on the basis of the article 441 § 1 of the code of penal
procedure by virtue of the decision as of December 11,
2008, of a legal issue requiring a basic interpretation of
an Act
“Does the sending of a procedural writ to a court – an
appeal in a form of an electronic document provided
with a safe electronic signature verified by the valid
qualified certificate referred to in art. 3 point 2 of the
Act of September 18, 2001 on electronic signature
((Journal of Laws 2001, vol. 130, item 1450 with
amendments) comply with the formal request of an
appeal as a procedural writ in view of the wording of
art. 5 par 2 of the aforementioned Act, resulting from
art. 105 § 1 of the Petty Offences Procedure Code and
art. 119 § 1 of the Code of Penal Procedure in
conjunction with article 38 § 1 of the Petty Offences
Procedure Code”.
has decided to refuse to answer the above mentioned
legal question
BASIS
The legal issue presented to the Supreme Court has
emerged from the following procedural situation:
The District Court [...] in K, X Magistrate’s Division, upon
the judgement of September 3, 2008, found Piotr B.
guilty of misdemeanor offences committed under art. 90
of the petty offences code and art. 65 § 2 of the petty
offences code, and under the provisions of art. 9 § 2 of
the petty offences code imposed the penalty of fine of
300 PLN. On September 5, the defendant filed a motion
to prepare and serve the judgement’s basis regarding
what took place on October 7, 2008. On October 14,
2008, a document in electronic form addressed to the
Regional Court in K. through the intermediary action of
the District Court, pointing out Piotr B. as the author,
containing the case reference number, date of October
14, 2008 and an indication, that it was the appeal of the
sentence “as it was passed as a result of numerous
offences”, arrived in the electronic mailbox of the
District Court [...] in K. It resulted from the official
acknowledgement of receipt of the submission, that the
document sent in an electronic form was provided with
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a safe electronic signature verified by the valid qualified
certificate in accordance with the requirement of the Act
of September 18, 2001 regarding electronic signature
((Journal of Laws, vol. 130, item 1450 with
amendments). The contents of that document in the
form of an electronic print-out have been included in the
files of the case. On October 23, 2008, the Chairperson
of the Magistrate’s Division of the District Court [...] in K,
having found that the appeal met the formal
requirements, ordered its acceptance and subsequently
the files were sent to the Regional Court in K. On
November 25, 2008, an authorized judge of the
Regional Court issued an order on determining an
appeal hearing. During that hearing, the Regional Court
in K. began to entertain doubts which it decided to pass
on to the Supreme Court, and formulated the legal
question set out above. On the basis of the decision,
attention was paid to the fact that, apart from a formal
defect in the appeal in the absence of the demands of a
complainant, a controversial point in the opinion of the
Court was the issue as to whether the filing of an appeal
in the form of an electronic document satisfies the
requirements resulting from art. 105 § 1 of the petty
offences procedure code of a written form of that appeal
remedy, and that, compared to the contents of art. 119 §
1 of the code of penal procedure in conjunction with art.
38 § 1 of the petty offences procedure code. Therefore
the Regional Court, noting the necessity to require the
complainant to remove the formal defect in the appeal
by specifying his demands, also considered the grounds
justifying ordering him to produce the missing written
form of an appeal remedy. As the Regional Court
discovered, that only when the Supreme Court decides
on a legal issue would it be possible to define the
factual scope of the formal defects of the appeal, and
thus requiring the defendant to remove them. However,
in the opinion of the Regional Court, there were no
doubts that in the light of art. 105 § 1 of the petty
offences procedure code there existed the requirement
of retaining a written form of an appeal, as well as,
according to art. 119 § 1 of the code of penal procedure,
the need arose to personally sign the appeal, with the
exception pointed out in article 119 § 2 of the code of
penal procedure. In the opinion of the Regional Court,
the contents of art. 5 paragraph 2 of the Act on
electronic signature raised doubts in respect of
interpretation, namely whether this rule covered the
scope of its regulation proceedings in petty offence
cases due to provisions of art. 105 § 1 of the petty
offences procedure code and art. 119 § 1 of the code of
penal procedure.
The Public Prosecutor of the State Prosecutor’s Office
filed a motion to refuse to answer the legal question on
the grounds of non-fulfillment of the prerequisites from
art. 441 § 1 of the code of penal procedure.
The Court considered the following:
The opinion of the Public Prosecutor of the State
Prosecutor’s Office was justified, because in the case
under consideration the conditions to respond to the
legal question posed were not met. There was no need
to repeat the prerequisites presented in the doctrine
and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, from the
fulfillment of which the preliminary rulling depended on
(see: R.A. Stefański, Institution of legal questions to the
Supreme Court in penal cases, Cracow 2001, page 252
and following). For the purposes of this case, it is
sufficient to recall that one of them is the existence of
the relationship between the legal question posed and
the decision of the court of appeal in a particular case.
In other words, the content of the court’s decision has to
depend on the answer provided in connection with the
appeal remedy to be considered. So, a legal question
cannot apply to a legal problem that arose while
considering an appeal remedy and be aimed at
explaining doubts, even justified ones but not
connected with the subject matter of the settlement (cf.
R.A. Stefański, Instytucja..., op.cit., pp. 352-362 and also
justification of the decision of the Supreme Court of July
26, 2007, I KZP 20/07, OSNKW 2007, vol 9, item, 63).
The legal question of the Regional Court in K. does not
satisfy the indicated requirement. In the current legal
situation of the proceedings, the Court did not consider
an appeal remedy brought against the procedural
decision on the refusal to approve the appeal (art. 429
of the code of penal procedure in conjunction with
article 109 § 2 of the petty offences procedure code) or
to leave it without its consideration (article 430 of the
code of penal procedure in conjunction with article 109
§ 2 of the petty offences procedure code), but began to
entertain doubts whether, on account of drawing up the
appeal in the form of an electronic document, it was
accepted reasonably and then sent to the appeal
proceedings. Thus the legal question posed concerns
the issue, the explanation of which has no influence on
the factual consideration of the appeal, but is connected
with the form of lodging of an appeal remedy. Therefore,
the Supreme Court refused to answer the legal
question.
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Nevertheless, noting the importance for the judicial
experience of the problem that has been raised, certain
remarks have to be made. From the contents of the
question and its rationale, the issue concerns the
opportunity to lodge procedural writs through e-mail
both in penal and petty offences procedure provisions of
which are applied in petty offences cases (art. 1 § 2 of
the petty offences procedure code). In the case under
consideration, it concerns the filing of the appeal. This
problem arose in connection with the coming into force
of the Act of September 18, 2001 on electronic signature
(Journal of Laws No 130, item 1450 – in short a.e.s), as
article 5 paragraph 2 of that Act introduces what is
called the rule of equivalence, according to which a
document in an electronic form provided with a safe
electronic signature verified by a valid qualified
certificate has the same legal effects as a document
provided with somebody’s personal signature, unless
separate regulations provide otherwise. An electronic
signature is the data in an electronic form that together
with other data has been attached to or with which they
are logically related, and are used to identify a person
providing an electronic signature (art. 3 point 1 of a.e.s),
while a safe electronic signature should fulfill the
conditions specified in art. 3 point 2a-c of a.e.s. It is
pointed out in publications, that an electronic signature
may, apart from legal applications, also be used in
pleadings, but restrictions concerning the replacement
of traditional documents by documents signed with a
safe electronic signature may result from the lack of
opportunities to apply the electronic form due to the
ban resulting from special regulations or from the lack
of appropriate regulations (cf. R. Podpłoƒski, P.Popis,
Eectronic Signature. Commentary, Warsaw 2004, pp.
167-169, J. Janowski, Electronic signature in legal
transactions, Warsaw 2007, p.269 and next ones, J.
Rzymowski, M. Kamiński, Electronic signature,
Commentary, Łódź 2992, pp. 19-21). Restrictions
resulting from special provisions were introduced by the
law-maker, for example in art. 125 par. 2 of the code of
civil procedure. However, restrictions caused by the lack
of appropriate provisions are connected with the
obligation to implement the provisions of the act on
electronic signature, that the law-maker imposed on the
public authority in article 58 item 2 of the act on
electronic signature, as by May 1, 2008 these
authorities should make it possible for the recipients of
certification services to lodge applications and motions
as well as other activities in an electronic form in cases,
when the provisions of law require them to be lodged in
a specified form or in accordance with a determined
pattern. In civil procedure, even before the entering into
force of the act on electronic signature, a regulation was
introduced that the procedural letter should be filed on
official forms or electronic IT carriers only when a
special provision shall so provide (art. 125 § 2 of the
code of civil procedure in the wording granted under the
act of May 24, 2000 on the change to the act - Code of
civil procedure (...) – Journal of Laws no 48, item 554). In
the subsequent amendments to that provision (act of
September 4, 2008 on the change to acts in order to
standardize the IT terminology – Journal of Laws no 171,
item 1056 and the act of January 9, 2009 on the change
to the act - Code of civil procedure and some other acts
– Journal of Laws no 26, item 156), so at the time when
the act on electronic signature was binding and
effective, the law-maker did not change the rule that a
procedural writ might be lodged electronically when a
special provision permits to do so. However, he
introduced a condition that such a writ should be
provided with a safe electronic signature within the
meaning of the art. 3 item 1 of the act on electronic
signature (art. 126 § 5 of the code of civil procedure –
added by virtue of the act of January 9, 2009). Similarly,
in the code of the administrative procedure, before the
act on electronic signature became valid and binding, in
art. 63 § 1 of the code of administrative procedure (after
the amendment in the act dated December 29, 1998 on
the change of some acts as a result of implementation
of the systemic reform of the State – Journal of Laws no
162 item 1126) the opportunity to file applications
through e-mail was introduced, where by virtue of the
act of February 17, 2005 on the computerization of
activities of entities performing public tasks (Journal of
Laws No 64, item 565) to art. 63 paragraph 3a was
added according to which, an application lodged in the
form of an electronic document should be provided with
a safe electronic signature verified by the valid qualified
certificate in accordance with the principles stipulated
in the provisions on an electronic signature (§ 3a item
1). Similar regulation in the proceedings before
administrative courts (act of August 30, 2002, Law on
proceedings before administrative courts – Journal of
Laws No 153, item 1270 with amendments) were not
introduced. Therefore, in the case law of the
administrative courts, the opinion was expressed that in
the court and administrative proceedings, a party
cannot effectively lodge a procedural writ electronically
(see decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of
September 10, 2008, I OZ 673/08, Lex no 460225).
273© Pario Communications Limited, 2009 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6
In petty offences procedures, a law-maker allows for
the delivery of a letter through e-mail (art. 132 § 3 of the
code of penal procedure in conjunction with art. 38 § 1
of the petty offences procedure code – this regulation
was introduced by the act of January 10, 2003 on the
change of the act (...) – Journal of Laws No 17, item 155).
However, the regulations concerning deliveries included
in chapter 15 of the code of penal procedure (applied to
petty offences procedure in art. 38 § 1 of the petty
offences procedure code) are addressed to procedural
authorities and not to parties, so they do not refer to the
rules of lodging litigation letters by a party (see
justification of the resolution of the Supreme Court of
January 20, 2005, I KZP 28/04, OSNKW 2005, vol, 1 item
1).
Moreover it should be noted, that the act of February
17, 2005 on the computerization of activities of entities
performing public functions (Journal of Laws No 64, item
565) also covering courts within its subjective scope
(art. 2 par. 1 item 1), imposes the requirement of
providing opportunities for the exchange of electronic
documents related to the arrangement of issues
remaining within the scope of activities of a public entity
with the use of information carriers of data or means of
electronic communication (art. 16 par. 1 of the act). Such
an obligation is realized among others by access to the
electronic mailbox (see the ordinance of the Prime
Minister of September 29, 2005 concerning technical
and organizational conditions of delivering electronic
documents to public entities – Journal of Laws no 200
ite, 1651). It should, however, be considered that the
electronic form of exchange of documents (art. 1 item 6
of the act) does not refer to procedural activities in court
proceedings, as the term “exchange of information”
related to the arrangement of issues should be
associated with the activities of the court administration
and not with procedural ones, in that procedural laws
do not use the term “information”. So it should be
assumed that the term “court” applied in that act
means a court in the organizational and systemic
meaning, and not in the procedural meaning (see G.
Szpor, Cz. Martysz, K. Wojsyk, Act on computerization of
activities of performing public tasks. Commentary,
Warsaw 2007, p. 16).
It results from the specification of legal acts as
presented concerning the issue under consideration,
that in spite of the introduction, by the act on electronic
signature, of the rule of equivalence of legal effects of
electronic documents with traditional ones (art. 5 item 2
of the act on electronic signature), the law-maker has
decided that the issues of admissibility to lodge
procedural writs electronically is regulated separately in
the procedural acts, which also introduces the
requirement to use electronic signatures. There are no
regulations in the code of procedure in cases of petty
offences, nor in the code of penal procedure. In
proceedings in cases of petty offence, in accordance
with art. 116 of the code of penal procedure in
conjunction with art. 38 § 1 of the petty offences
procedure code, parties have to make procedural
declarations in writing or orally to the minutes. Appeals
and complaints are lodged in writing, but complaints
may also be lodged orally to the minutes of the court
session or sitting (art. 105 § 1 and the art. 108 of the
petty offences procedure code) where a procedural writ
should bear a signature of the person lodging it (art 119
§ 1 item 4 of the code of penal procedure in conjunction
with art. 38 § 1 of the petty offences procedure code).
The contents of these provisions leads to an
unambiguous conclusion, that an appeal has to have a
form of a written document provided with handwritten
signature of a person drawing it up (see reasons of the
resolution of the Supreme Court of December 20, 2006,
I KZP 29/06, OSNKW 2007, vol, 1 item 1). So, in the
current legal circumstances it should be assumed,
following the directive of the external systemic
interpretation of ensuring coherence of the legal system
within the scope of approved legal solutions, that the
lack both in the petty offences procedure code as well
as in the code of penal procedure of appropriate
regulations concerning the lodging of procedural writs
electronically, constitutes an axiological gap what
should be interpreted as a negative regulation (see L.
Morawski, Interpretation in courts’ jurisprudence.
Commentary, Toruń 2002, p. 193). The act on electronic
signature regulates a completely new area in Polish law
that is technically advanced, so the introduction of new
solutions included in the law to individual procedures
requires an appropriate preparation. Therefore, the law-
maker, in spite of the contents of art. 5 item 2 of the act
on electronic signature, points out the scope of the
application of an electronic document only by way of
additional separate legal acts. In the petty offences
procedure, as well as in penal procedure, there is a
difference between what the law ought to be, as
opposed to what the law is, and this issue requires
regulation (see K. Woźniewski, gloss to the resolution of
the Supreme Court of December 20, 2006, I KZP 29/06,
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Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze 2007, no 4, p. 149 and
following).
Summing up the foregoing deliberations, the opinion
should be expressed that the procedural declaration of
a party sent in a form of an electronic document in
accordance with the provisions of the act of September
18, 2001 on electronic signature (Journal of Laws no 130
item 1450 with amendments) does not produce a legal
effect in the form of lodging an appeal, as both in the
petty offences procedure as well as in penal procedure,
such a form of legal action has not been stipulated.
From the contents of art. 105 § 1 of the petty offences
procedure code and art. 116 of the code of penal
procedure in conjunction with art. 38 § 1 of the petty
offences procedure code, an appeal can only be lodged
exclusively in writing, and as far as procedural writs are
concerned, art. 120 § 1 of the code of penal procedure is
applied. So, when a party has lodged an appeal in the
form of an electronic document, there are no grounds to
appeal in the absence of the lack of the written form.
Another form of appealing against the judgment applied
by the party cannot be regarded as lodging of the
appeal (see T. Grzegorczyk, Commentary to the Code of
Penal Procedure., Warsaw 2008, p. 905, W. Grzeszczyk,
Commentary to the Code of Penal Procedure., Warsaw
2008, p. 437, S. Zabłocki [in:] Commentary to the Code
of Penal Procedure., 2nd edition, edited by R.A.
Stefański, S. Zabłocki, vol. III, Warsaw 2004, p. 42).
However, the opportunity to contend for the restoration
of a term to lodge an appeal because of an erroneous
opinion on the effectiveness of a legal transaction
performed in a form different than that legally required,
is a separate issue (art. 126 § 1 of the code of penal
procedure in conjunction with art. 38 § 1 of the petty
offences procedure code).
Considering the above, the Supreme Court has
decided, as set forth, the dispositive part of the
decision.1
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Commentary
The Supreme Court expressed an opinion that despite
the wording of article 5 section 2 of the 2001 Act, which
equates a secure electronic signature with handwritten
signature, the appeal was not acceptable:
Art. 5.
2. Dane w postaci elektronicznej opatrzone
bezpiecznym podpisem elektronicznym
weryfikowanym przy pomocy ważnego
kwalifikowanego certyfikatu są równoważne pod
względem skutków prawnych dokumentom
opatrzonym podpisami własnoręcznymi, chyba że
przepisy odrębne stanowią inaczej.
Article 5
2. The electronic data signed with a secure electronic
signature verified with the use of a valid qualified
certificate shall have legal effects equivalent to
documents signed with a hand-written signature,
unless separate provisions provide otherwise.
The use of an electronic signature in criminal procedure
is not possible because there are no relevant
regulations in place. This was treated by the Supreme
Court as a legal gap, which indicated the intent of the
legislator not to permit the use of electronic signatures
in criminal proceedings. Where an appeal is sent
electronically as it was in this case, it is without any
legal effect and no further steps are to be taken.
In this case, the Supreme Court refused to answer the
question referred by a lower court on procedural
grounds, but nevertheless expressed its opinion. The
opinion may raise doubts, because according to the
decision, and despite the wording of article 5 of the
2001 act, a separate regulation concerning electronic
signature is required for every procedure. This seems to
be in contrary with the rule of equivalency contained in
art 5. Moreover, even if the above mentioned point of
view of the Supreme Court is correct, it is disputable on
the grounds that the sender of an appeal in electronic
form should be able to correct the appeal within seven
days (see the commentary to case I KZP 29/06 in
Volume 5 (2008) 147 - 148 in respect of a previous ruling
of the Supreme Court concerning an appeal sent by
facsimile transmission). In this case the Supreme Court
expressed different opinion than in the case decided in
2006 which concerned an appeal sent by facsimile
transmission.
1 Judgments or decisions in Poland have two parts:
the ruling (częs´c´ dyspozytywna) and the reasons
(częs´c´ motywacyjna). The dispositive part of the
decision is what the court decided in the case. 
Commentary by Dr Arkadiusz Lach, who is a member of the
editorial board
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